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THE LAND QUESTION IN ZIMBABWE : CAN INDIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE PROVIDE THE ANSWERS?
Webster Chinamora*
Lecturer, Department of Public Law, University of Zimbabwe
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines first, the nature of the land issue and how it was dealt with in the 
Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979* 1 which gave Zimbabwe its independence. 
Furthermore, the goals of the government's National Land Policy will be outlined. In this 
regard, the amendment to the Constitution to achieve the realisation of those objectives 
will be examined. Finally, an analysis will be made of the possible challenges that could be 
made to the constitutional amendments and relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition 
Act of 1992.2 The jurisprudence from India dealing with amendments to constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing an owner's right to property will be discussed and suggestions 
made on how the issue could be approached in Zimbabwe. India has been selected for 
illustration because India emerged from British colonial rule (like Zimbabwe) with a 
dichotomy of extremely rich and propertied classes and the pathetically poor and backward 
classes. It will be demonstrated that the problems of constitutional interpretation likely to 
arise reflect the crisis of trying to balance individual private rights to property and the 
public interest in land reorganisation ostensibly aimed at redressing past colonial 
imbalances.
The land grievance was born out of colonial legislation such as the Land Apportionment 
Act of 19303 which resulted in the forced alienation of land from indigenous Africans to 
white settlers. Land was inequitably divided between a population of about 4 000 000 
blacks and 250 000 whites. The land was divided between African areas or "the nativ.e 
reserves" and European areas, with the former being predominantly barren and sandy 
regions least suited for agricultural production. By 1931 whites held 50% of the land under 
freehold title, while the state held approximately 23% of the land, small-scale (black) farm 
areas held 5% and the Communal Areas held 22% of the land.4 However, by 1965 private 
farmers held 45% of the land while Communal Areas held 40% with black small-scale 
farmers holding less than 3% of the land.5 To aggravate the situation, in terms of the Land 
Apportionment Act,6 no African was allowed to acquire, lease or occupy land in a European
I gratefully acknowledge Dr Lovemore Madhuku of the Department of Public Law, University of 
Zimbabwe, for his helpful comments on the initial draft of this article. However, the views expressed 
in the article are mine.
1. The Constitution which resulted from the Agreement is contained in Volume 1, p 3 of the Statute Law 
of Zimbabwe (Revised Edition) 1996.
2. Chapter 20:10.
3. This Act was replaced by the Land Tenure Act in 1969, but land tenure remained racially segregated.
4. Moyo S, "The Land Question" in Mandaza I. (ed), Zimbabiue, The Political Economy of Transition 
(Codesria, Dakar, 1986) p 168.
5. Ibid.
6. Section 42.
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area as doing so constituted a criminal offence. The exceptions were African employees 
whose presence on such land was necessitated by their employment, or Africans occupying 
land for educational, religious or other purposes acceptable to the authorities.
The issue of land is significant because over 70% of the country's population lives directly 
off the land and the agricultural sector contributes substantially to the economy.7 The land 
grievance was to occupy a major part of the politics of Rhodesia and still remains a burning 
issue to this day.8 To underscore the importance attached to the land question, a National 
Land Policy was adopted by Government in 19909 10to facilitate the government's acquisition 
of land for resettlement purposes, first, by amending the property provision of the 
Constitution and then enacting the Land Acquisition Act.111
It is added that the Constitution of 1980 was a compromise reached hastily in order to end 
the war. More specifically, the agreement on property rights was grudgingly accepted by 
the Patriotic Front only after pledges by Britain to subsidise the costs of the resettlement 
programme.11 The Lancaster House Agreement lasted for ten years and as a result the 
government's hands were tied till it expired on 18 April 1990. It is submitted that the error 
of history is that the land question should have been dealt with at the constitutional talks 
at Lancaster and not addressed through the device of a sunset clause. The entrenched 
provisions could only achieve their protective purposes while they lasted. The net effect of 
the clauses was merely to delay the implementation of objectives that remained embedded 
on the political agenda of the nationalist negotiators. Not surprisingly, the question of land 
acquisition was resuscitated prominently in 1990. The issue is currently a bone of contention.
A Constitutional Review Commission was recently appointed by Government to draw up 
a new Constitution for Zimbabwe.12 It is hoped that the Commission will give careful 
consideration to the property clause and how to protect existing property rights and to 
balance those rights against the public interest in land resettlement. In other jurisdictions, 
like Germany, not all provisions of the Constitution are amendable. For example, 
amendments which change the very substance of the Constitution, namely, the federal 
system and concept of the democratic rule of law and separation of powers, are 
inadmissible.13 Perhaps, the time has now come for the Constitution which is being 
developed to follow this example. This is a much better approach rather than leaving the 
protection of fundamental rights to judicial activism and ingenuity.
7- Moyo S., "Land Tenure Issues in Zimbabwe in the 1990s" Unpublished paper prepared for the Forestry 
Commission of Zimbabwe in January 1992.
8. The Constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia of 1979 never addressed the land issue. In fact, it restricted 
compulsory acquisition of land for resettlement purposes to land not "substantially" used for 
agriculture in the 5 years preceding the acquisition, and required that the highest market value for 
such land in that period be paid as compensation. This was difficult to achieve as almost all the land 
in white hands was commercial farm land.
9. The timing of the policy is explained by the fact that existing property rights were guaranteed for 10 
years of the Constitution coming into force in 1980.
10. This replaced the first post-independence land tenure legislation, the Land Acquisition Act of 1985.
11. Coldham S, "The Land Acquisition Act, 1992 of Zimbabwe" (1993) Journal of African Lazu.
12. This Commission was established in terms of Presidential Proclamation No. 6 of 1999.
13. Article 79, section 3 as read with Articles 1 and 20 of the German Basic Law (which is the Constitution). 
See also, Article 131 of the Namibian Constitution which does not permit an amendment or repeal of 
any section of Bill of Rights which "diminishes or detracts from the fundamental rights and freedoms".
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THE PROPERTY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
The property protection provision of the Constitution/4 though different from what it was 
soon after Lancaster, still provides that no property of any description or interest or right 
in property shall be compulsorily acquired except under the authority of law. The original 
agreement was that if property has to be acquired under any expropriation law, the 
"acquiring authority" had inter alia, "to pay promptly adequate compensation" for the 
acquisition.14 5 In addition, such compensation was remittable abroad.16
It is to be expected that because the land grievance was not adequately addressed in the 
Constitution, once the entrenched provisions expired the issue resurfaced with all its vigour. 
The then Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, when introducing the 
Land Acquisition Bill on 12 March 1992, made it clear that its objective was to redress 
historical inequities in land distribution and to take account of current national and 
international socio-economic realities.17 *
The first post-independence land tenure legislation, the Land Acquisition Act of 1985, was 
limited in its scope since it provided that, only under-utilised land which was required for 
resettlem ent or other public purposes could be acquired compulsorily.16 Because 
compensation has to be adequate and promptly paid for the ten years that this arrangement 
lasted, severe constraints were placed on the government's land policy. In fact, the 
government ended up paying extremely high and speculative prices for property 
compulsorily acquired.19
In the light of the historical alienation of land and the shortcomings of the Lancaster House 
Agreement, the magnitude of the constitutional amendment to enhance the land policy 
came as no surprise. The process started in 1990 with the amendment of the property clause 
of the Constitution, the objective being:
—  to enable the governm ent to acquire any land, including utilised land, for 
resettlement purposes;
—  to require "fair" compensation to be paid "within a reasonable time"; and
—  to abolish the right to remit compensation out of the country.20
The essential change was the compensation formula which shifted from "adequate" to 
"fair" compensation. Whether the adoption of the fomulation "fair" will have any practical 
significance is yet to be seen. This subject is more fully addressed in the following sections. 
Perhaps, there would have been less cause for concern if matters had been left at this. 
However, the amendment went further and attempts to preclude judicial determination of
14. Section 16 (1).
15. As expressed in section 16(l)(c) of the original Constitution.
16. Section 16 (5) (a).
17 . Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 18, No. 61, Columns 4413 and 4418.
18 . Section 3 (l)(a)(iii).
19 . Hlatshwayo B., "The Legal Framework for Compulsory Acquisition of Land, Land Use, Planning
and Tenure Systems in Zimbabwe" Unpublished paper presented at the Association of District Councils 
Seminar in Harare on 16-17 March 1993. See also, Hlatshwayo B, "Land Expropriation Laws in 
Zimbabwe and their Compatibility with International Legal Norms" 1993-4 Zimbabwe Law Review 
(Vol 11) 41 at p. 45 et seq.
20. See Section 6 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 11) Act 30 of 1990.
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whether compensation is indeed fair. This is bound to create problems in that awards may 
become arbitrary if the fairness thereof is not subject to independent scrutiny. It will be 
demonstrated in sections below that there is ample scope for judicial review of the fairness 
of compensation in terms of settled administrative law principles.
THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT OF 1992
To provide a statutory basis for land acquisition in terms of the constitutional amendment, 
the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 was passed which essentially carried the same provisions 
as its predecessor. The only notable difference was that the government's right of first 
refusal as regards rural land was removed. However, certain provisions of the Act need to 
be highlighted as they may be a potential source of litigation.
Acquisition of Rural Land
In terms of the Act,21 the Minister of Lands and Water Resources, may acquire rural land 
for resettlement, environmental conservation and/or other public purposes. When doing 
so, the Minister is required to specify the purpose for which the acquisition is intended, 
the acquiring authority and the period (not exceeding ten years) within which it is intended 
to acquire the land.22
While the Act gives an owner of designated land the right to object to the Minister regarding 
the designation,23 the Minister nonetheless has absolute discretion whether to confirm, 
revoke or amend the designation notice, and his decision is final.24 It is curious that the 
designation, according to the Act, does not affect the rights of the owner to use and occupy 
the land.25 Nevertheless, he may not sell, lease or otherwise dispose of his land without the 
permission of the Minister,26 and the Act specifically voids any purported sale, lease or 
other disposal of the land.27 However, the Act provides that where the Minister's consent 
is withheld, the owner may ask the acquiring authority to acquire the land in which event 
it must take immediate steps to do so.28
In 1994, a judgement was rendered by the High Court on whether designation constitutes 
compulsory acquisition to the extent that it places a substantial burden on the owner's 
use.29 30It was ruled that designation does not amount to acquisition. The Supreme Court in 
an appeal by the disgruntled landowners agreed with the High Court.311
With respect to designated rural land, the compensation procedure is as follows:
21. Section 12 (1).
22. Section 12 (2).
23. Section 13 (1).
24. Section 13 (3).
25. Section 15 (2)(a).
26. Section 14 (1).
27. Section 14 (5).
28. Section 14 (4).
29. Alistair Davies and Others v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development H-H-185-94.
30. Davies and Others v Minister of Land, Agriculture and Water Development 1996 (1) ZLR 681 (S).
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A Com pensation Comm ittee is established whose function is to determ ine the 
compensation payable in respect of the acquisition.31
A designated valuation officer will prepare a preliminary assessment of the compensation 
payable and forward it to the Compensation Committee.32
The compensation must be fair.33 It must be arrived at by the assessment principles in the 
Act,34 (and First Schedule) and ministerial guidelines complying with the assessment 
principles35 and other relevant considerations.36
If a claimant or acquiring authority is not satisfied with the assessment of compensation, 
such aggrieved party may refer the assessment to the Administrative Court for review of 
the Compensation Committee's decision.37 However, the court may not set aside the 
assessment unless satisfied that the Committee did not observe any of the principles 
prescribed.38
The Minister is also authorised to fix the form and manner in which compensation is paid, 
and the period over which it is paid, but at least half must be paid at the time of acquisition, 
at least half of the remainder within two years and the balance over five years.39
The Scope for Judicial Review
It appears that under this procedure, although there is scope for judicial intervention, the 
role of the judiciary has been narrowly circumscribed. Limiting the court's role to an enquiry 
of whether the principles prescribed were followed may, on the face of it, mean that the 
court has no independent discretion. Nevertheless, with an ingenious court that 
investigation could extend to an enquiry into the fairness of the compensation, more so, 
since the Compensation Committee must be guided in its assessment by other relevant 
considerations. As such, it should be possible for the court to examine what extra 
considerations may have influenced the decision of the committee apart from the principles 
laid down, and whether the committee was justified in so doing. If certain relevant factors, 
as directed by section 21, were not considered, the court could set aside the assessment. At 
any rate, it is trite law that a court will set aside decisions of a grossly unreasonable nature 
— i.e. which are so grossly unreasonable that they could only have been arrived at mala 
fide, through ulterior motive or failure of the decision-maker to apply its mind to the decision 
it has to make.40 In addition, a decision can be set aside if the facts relating to the exercise of 
the discretion were not reasonably capable of supporting the action taken.41
31. Section 17 (1) and (3).
32. Section 18 (1).
33. Section 16 (a).
34. Section 19 (1) and First Schedule.
35. Section 19 (3).
36. Section 21.
37. Section 23 (2).
38. Proviso to section 23 (4).
39. Section 19 (5).
40. Kaplan v Salisbury Liquor Licencing Court 1951 (4) SA 223 (SR). See also, Kambasha Bros v Thompson NO 
and Anor 1970 (2) RLR 97; Archipelago Ltd v Liquor Licencing Board 1986(1) ZLR 146 (HC).
41. See, Minister of Home Affairs v Austin and Harper 1986 (1) ZLR 240 (SC), 1986 (4) SA 281 (ZSC).
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In this regard, Indian cases may become relevant since, in Vajravelu v Special Deputy Collector42 
a constitutional amendment had removed the power of the court to enquire into the 
adequacy of compensation. Nevertheless, Subba Rao CJ, delivering judgement for the Indian 
Supreme Court, ruled that although the adequacy of compensation was non-justiciable, 
the court retained the power to enquire into the relevance of the principles according to 
which the legislation provided for compensation. It seems that there is sufficient scope for 
the court to set aside an assessment which, from its own perception, is unfair.
Yet another encouraging aspect is that an appeal lies to the Supreme Court in terms of the 
Administrative Court Act (Chapter 7:01).43 This opportunity, if properly utilised, may lead 
to the development of a useful body of case law. What is perplexing, though, is the Minister's 
absolute discretion to confirm, revoke or amend the designation notice and the finality of 
his decision. This provision, on the face of it, appears to foreclose judicial involvement. 
However, it is hoped that the M inister's decision would be informed by objective 
considerations, since the Minister is empowered to make investigations and afford the 
complainant an opportunity to make further representations.44 In any event, there is judicial 
authority for the proposition that the formulation "any such order or decision shall be 
final" does not bar review since it makes the decision final only on the facts and not on the 
law.45
Acquisition of Land Other than Rural Land
Land other than rural land may be more problematic because, if such land is to be 
compulsorily acquired, it must be reasonably necessary in the interests of defence, public 
order, public morality, public health, town and country planning or for a purpose beneficial 
to the public generally or a section thereof.46
The procedure for acquisition of this category of land is as follows:
A preliminary notice is published in the Government Gazette and served on the owner 
of the land to be acquired and other interested persons.47
The expropriatee may lodge a written objection to acquire the rest of the property if a 
part-appropriation would render the remainder unsuitable for the purpose it was 
being or would have been used.48
42. AIR 1965 SC 1017. See also PV Mudaliar v Special Deputy Collector 1965 (1) SCR 614.
43. Section 19.
44. Section 13(2) of Land Acquisition Act.
45. R v Medical Appeal Tribunal, Exparte Gilmore [1975] 1QB 575 (CA). See also, Anisminic v Foreign 
Compensation Committee [1969] 2 AC 223 (HL). At home, the issue was sealed by Chief Justice Gubbay 
who in Davies v Others supra at p. 693 F-H said:
" . . .  the finality of the Minister's decision does not oust the control of the High Court over 
administrative action by judicial review. See section 26 of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06]. If the 
designee is able to establish one of the grounds of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety, 
he will succeed in having the decision set aside or corrected."
46. Land Acquisition Act section 3(l)(a). See also section 16 (l)(b) of the Constitution which is to similar 
effect.
47. Section 5.
48. Section 6.
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While the notice subsists (for a year at most) the land may not be subdivided, disposed 
of or have permanent improvements made on it without the written consent of the 
acquiring authority.49 501
In the event of an objection, the acquiring authority must apply to theAdministrative 
Court for an order authorising or confirming the acquisition.5" If the order is granted, 
the title of the acquiring authority will be registered against the property.31 
"Fair and reasonable compensation"52 then has to be paid within a reasonable time 
from such registration, which is effected once a copy of the Court order is lodged with 
the Registrar of Deeds.53 Such compensation will be assessed with due regard to: 
the appropriatee's right to be compensated for his land; 
the general public interest in the acquisition of the land; and 
the value of the land, paying attention to its nature, location and quality and any 
other relevant factors.54
If there is no agreement on the claimant's right to compensation or the amount of 
compensation payable, either party may refer the issue to the Administrative Court.55
This catalogue has been given to provide a background for a discussion of the role the 
courts are likely to play in this scheme of things.
ANTICIPATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
Because the Land Acquisition Act has provided for different methods of calculating 
compensation for designated rural land and any other land, constitutional problems may 
arise. Academic comment has noted that compensation for the former may be challenged 
on the basis that it does not satisfy the "fair" compensation "within a reasonable time" 
criterion, because a higher standard has been set for "any other land".56 The question to be 
asked is what is the real difference between designated rural land and non-designated 
land or even non-designated rural land which calls for different compensation methods? 
If designation has the valid legislative objective of orderly resettlement of landless people 
at a reasonable cost, then that objective cannot be greater or less simply because the land is 
either rural or other land. There is no inherent quality in rural land or non-rural land which 
justifies the application of differential valuation methods.
In this regard, the Indian case of Kameshwar Singh v Province of Bihar57 offers some interesting 
insights. The dispute in that case centred around Article 31 (4) of the Indian Constitution
49. Section 5 (8).
50. Section 7(1).
51. Section 10.
52. It is noted that the construction in the Act differs from the one in the Constitution as it simply says 
"fair compensation".
53. In terms of Section 8, where there is no objection, an acquiring order will be lodged with the Registrar 
of Deeds for registration to be effected.
54. Section 20 (2).
55. Section 24 (2).
56' Hlatshwayo, "The Legal Framework of Compulsory Acquisition of Land" supra. However, the author 
noted in a later article, "Land Expropriation Laws in Zimbabwe" at p. 49 that "the differentiation per 
se can be justified in terms of both municipal and international law". He then referred, as authority 
for this proposition, to Commissioner of Taxes v CW (Pvt) Ltd 1990 52 SATC 77 at p. 85 which ruled that 
if the differentiation is related to the achievement of a valid legislative objective and all persons 
similarly circumstanced are treated alike then it can be justified. It will be shown that no possible 
justification can be found.
57. AIR 1950 392.
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which protected legislation aimed at abolishing the zamindar system from the scope of 
Article 31 (1). The Patna High Court relied on the equality clause in Article 14 to invalidate 
legislation providing for a graded system of compensation for land expropriated from the 
zamindars. This kind of legislation included the Bihar Land Reforms Act which provided 
for payment of compensation on a sliding scale — the greater the extent of the land holding 
expropriated, the smaller the amount of compensation per acre. The ruling activated and 
marked the beginning of a long drawn conflict between the judiciary and the legislature. 
The response of Parliament came in the form of the First Amendment of the Constitution, 
which expressly excluded zamindari abolition and state acquisition of agricultural estates 
from the protection of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Notwithstanding these 
amendments, in State of Bihar v Kameshwar Singh,5* the Supreme Court rejected the 
constitutionality of the Bihar Land Reforms Act describing it as law which authorised 
confiscation under the guise of acquisition of property. To overturn this decision, the 
legislature passed the Seventh Amendment which gave an expanded meaning to "estate" 
to cover all land holdings.
It appears section 13(3) and the proviso to section 23(4) of the Land Acquisition Act have 
been bolstered by sections 16(l)(f) of the Constitution which may be interpreted as 
foreclosing judicial review. This section removes the right of a claimant to approach the 
courts for the determination of any question relating to compensation in cases "where the 
property concerned is land." And, section 16(2) goes further to provide that a law providing 
for compulsory acquisition of land "shall not be called into question by any court on the 
grounds that the compensation provided by the law is not fair". In my view, it should be 
possible for the courts to investigate the question of whether a designation is, objectively 
speaking, "reasonably necessary" for the purpose it has been made. If it is not rationally 
connected to any of the purposes mentioned in the Land Acquisition Act, it is submitted 
that the court can (and should) invalidate it.58 9 An example of an acquisition with no rational 
connection to the stipulated statutory purposes is one motivated by political vindictiveness. 
The courts should have no difficulty in nullifying it. As previously noted, a court can set 
aside a compensation assessment if the statutory principles and relevant factors were not 
observed by a Compensation Committee. It is submitted that the legislature could never 
have intended a situation to arise where, regardless of whether the Compensation 
Committee has followed the law or not, or has been irrational, that its assessment would 
nonetheless escape judicial scrutiny. They might well have set no criteria to guide it if its 
decisions were beyond question. At any rate, a court of law could not possibly rule that 
compensation provided by a particular legislation is not fair in the abstract. It is from the 
practical application of the compensation provision that a court is able to determine whether 
or not the decision-maker acted ultra vires, was biased or acted rationally. Therefore, the 
purported foreclosure of judicial scrutiny is more illusory than real.
The basis of the provision for compensation within a reasonable time is that, if a system of 
staggered payments was not provided for, then lack of financial resources would
58. AIR 1952 SC 252.
59. For the concept of "rational connection" see, The Queen v Oakes Supreme Court of Canada, [1986] 
1SCR 103: (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200. See also, Commissioner of Taxes v CW (Pvt) Ltd supra.
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compromise the National Land Policy.611 It is envisaged that little difficulty will be 
encountered with the concept of "reasonableness" in as-much-as this concept is well 
developed in the realm of private law such as contract. General guidance may, therefore, 
be sought from this field of law, in particular, such cases as Putco Ltd v TV and Radio Guarantee 
Co (Ptxj) Ltd.M
Another area of potential controversy is the new requirement of "fair and reasonable 
compensation" instead of the previous one of "adequate compensation". The case of May 
and Others v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,62 decided by a divided court, although dealing with 
the previous "adequate compensation" provision may, nevertheless, provide a helpful 
starting point. In this case, Dumbutshena CJ equated adequate compensation to a payment 
of the market value for the property.
However, in a separate concurring opinion McNally JA warned that:
The market price, however, may not be the appropriate basis for determ ining  
compensation. The particular circumstances of each case may dictate some other 
measure. Compensation is a matter of equity, and of being fair both to the person 
expropriated and to the general public for whose sake the expropriation is undertaken, 
and from whose pockets, by way of taxation, the price ultimately comes.'’3
The McNally formulation seems to imply that depending on the circumstances of the case 
under consideration "adequate compensation" and "fair compensation" may mean the 
same thing. Each case would therefore have to be judged on its own peculiarities. 
Presumably, the fact that the government relies mainly on taxes for its revenues and that 
the compensation will be funded from these revenues will be a decisive consideration.
It may also be helpful to look at CW v Commissioner of Taxes.60 1234 In this case, the proviso to the 
Capital Gains Act providing exemptions exclusively for those who did not contest their 
compensation payments was held to be unconstitutional, as it deprived the claimant 
"adequate compensation", which was held to be the full money equivalent of the 
expropriated property.65 It is submitted that the McNally formulation in May's case (supra) 
is preferable from a practical point of view as it is not unduly rigid and allows public 
interest considerations to come into play in the assessment process. The court might also 
have to look at how the problem was addressed in other jurisdictions with the formulation 
"adequate", "fair", "equitable" or "appropriate" and even "full compensation".66
It is generally accepted that whether compensation is qualified as adequate, full, just, fair, 
reasonable, appropriate or some other description tells very little about accounting for the 
value of the property expropriated, since a degree of attitudinal subjectivity on the part of 
the presiding judge is inevitable.67 Thus, it could be said that depending on the judicial
60. Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates supra Columns 4438 and 4439 (Minister of Lands).
61. 1985 (4) SA 809 (AD).
62. 1986 (3) SA 107 (ZSC).
63. At p 124 H-H-I.
64. 1990 (2) SA 245 (ZSC).
65. Atp. 264A-C.
66. For a discussion of how the issue was resolved in other countries, see Eisenberg J.A., "Different 
Constitutional Formulations of Compensation Clauses" (1993) 4 SA]HR 414 and the cases discussed.
67. Murphy J. "Compensation for Expropriation in International Law" (1993) 110 SAL] at p. 82.
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officer, what is fair compensation may not meet the expectations of the expropriatee in 
every case. For instance, in James v United Kingdom,™ it was noted that:
Legitimate objectives of public interest such as pursued in measures of economic reform 
or m easures designed to achieve a greater social justice may call for less than 
reimbursement of full market value.
This observation is particularly relevant to acquisitions motivated by resettlement or other 
public interest considerations. With a judge whose sympathies lie with the government's 
objective of redressing colonial land tenure inequities, the public interest might very well 
override the private individualistic expectations.68 9 70
It is interesting that the Government perceived fair compensation as being "to compensate 
fully for the value of permanent improvements (only) rather than to pay for the land itself".711 
However, this does not appear to meet the criterion of fair compensation and seems 
inconsistent with the provisions of section 6 of the First Schedule which envisage 
compensating for the land itself. The Minister's attitude therefore remains disturbing, 
particularly with respect to designated rural land, because he is charged with the task of 
issuing guidelines to the Compensation Committee. If such guidelines are based on the 
premise of non-compensation for the land "itself" then the potential for litigation looms 
large. It is most likely that any assessment based on guidelines which do not provide for 
compensation for land would be nullified by the courts for failing to consider statutory 
and/or relevant considerations.
What is dear, however, is that the Land Acquisition Act and the constitutional amendments 
have introduced a crisis of values in Zimbabwe. There are the rights of private individuals 
to the security of their land juxtaposed against the competing public interest in equitable 
redistribution of land. A balance must therefore be struck between these divergent interests.
68. (1986) 8 EHRR 125.
69. For example, in Alistair Davies v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development supra (at pp. 18- 
20 of the cyclostyled judgement), Chidyausiku J. (as he then was) made the following comments: 
"But the fact of the matter is that the facts that make land acquisition for resettlement a matter of 
public interest in Zimbabwe are so obvious that even the blind can see them. These facts make the 
resettlement of people a legitimate public interest. In my view anybody who has lived in Zimbabwe 
long enough needs no affidavit to know the following facts which are common knowledge, which 
make acquisition of land for resettlement imperative for public interest, these are: once upon a time 
the land in Zimbabwe belonged to the African people of this country. By some means, foul or fair, 
depending on who you are in Zimbabwe, about half that land ended up in the hands of a very small 
minority of Zimbabweans of European descent. The other half remained in the hands of the large 
majority who were Africans. . . It is also common knowledge that when the Africans lost half their 
land to the Europeans they were paid nothing by way of compensation . . .  It is in an effort to reconcile 
and meet these conflicting expectations and demands that Government has embarked on a programme 
to acquire land for resettlement and designation is part of the process. There is no doubt that such a 
programme is in the public interest." It is predictable, therefore, what attitude to amount of 
compensation a judge like Chidyausiku )P would take in the light of the sentiments expressed above.
70. Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates supra at column 4446.
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THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS
In opening the 1991 Legal Year in Harare, Chief Justice Gubbay said, inter alia,
The amendment to the Constitution is likely to engender a belief in those persons 
whose land may be acquired that the express right to be paid "fair" compensation is 
nothing but an empty handed gesture. But it must not . . .  be assumed, that an 
affirm ative vote of one hundred m em bers will enable Parliam ent to pass a 
constitutional bill which goes on the extent of damaging or destroying the very 
foundation or structure of the Constitution. A Constitution stands on certain  
fundamental principles which are its structural pillars. If these pillars are demolished 
or even damaged the constitutional edifice will fall. There is an implied limitation on 
the [amending] powers which preclude Parliament from abrogating or changing the 
identity of the Constitution or any of its basic features.71
Consequently, the clear message is that any law which has that effect will be pronounced 
invalid by the judiciary. A change to the Constitution is permissible if consistent with its 
basic objective and if the Constitution is able to survive such change without loss of its 
identity — its basic structure must always remain intact. A change is impermissible if it 
abrogates or emasculates the pivotal or fundamental features of the Constitution. As already 
noted, in Germany, the Constitution has addressed the problem by prohibiting any 
amendments which have the effect of undermining the very basis of constitutional and 
democratic governance.
Although the Chief Justice has expressed an inclination towards invalidating the 
constitutional amendments, this could be interpreted to mean that he will stand sentinel 
over the sanctity of private property, a development which is not unique to Zimbabwe. 
This was the approach adopted by the Indian Supreme Court in Golak Nath v State of Punjab72 
and Kesavananda v State of Kerala73 where the court had to consider the scope of the powers 
of Parliament to amend the Constitution. In Golak Nath's case a majority of seven to six 
judges held that fundamental rights, including the right to property, were absolutely 
sovereign, and that not even a two thirds majority of Parliament, exercising its power to 
amend the constitution under Article 368 had authority to infringe fundamental rights. 
Accordingly, the court held that any constitutional amendment purporting to repeal or 
even restrict a fundamental right was invalid.
Subsequently, in Kesavananda, before a full bench of 13 judges, on the amending power of 
the legislature, a majority of seven judges held that the relevant amending provision did 
not allow Parliament to abrogate the basic features of the Constitution. The majority rejected 
the distinction between essential and non-essential features of the Constitution and 
suggested that Article 368 extended to the entire Constitution. Although the validity of the 
constitutional amendment was upheld, the court emphatically stated that it retained the 
right to review all constitutional amendments in terms of their compatibility with the core 
of the Constitution.
) i
71. This speech is reproduced in the Legal Forum Vol. 3 (March 1991) at pp. 6-8.
72. AIR 1967,1643.
73. AIR 1973, SC 1461.
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The danger, though, should the Zimbabwean judiciary follow the Indian example, is that 
it might be viewed as an attempt to protect existing distributions of ownership at the expense 
of public interest values underpinning the Land Acquisition Act and the constitutional 
amendments designed to pave the way for land redistribution. Then, the same vicious 
circle of one amendment followed by another could be repeated as happened in India. It is 
therefore hoped that the Constitutional Commission will address this in the constitutional 
document itself to pre-empt the problems indicated above.
For Zimbabwe (and, it is suggested South Africa as well), the issue has to be approached 
with caution, given the land tenure history of both countries. In this respect, it is instructive 
to consider the following helpful remarks by Judge Didcott:
What a bill of rights cannot afford to do here . . .  is to protect private property with 
such zeal that it entrenches privilege. A major problem which any future South African 
Government is bound to face will be the problem of poverty, of its alleviation and of 
the need for the country's wealth to be shared most equitably.74
Therefore, a judge deciding on issues which are so politically charged, might have to heed 
this warning. In any event, the Zimbabwean Constitution has no hierarchy of rights and 
no right can be said to be superior to the other. Nor is there a hierarchy of provisions. The 
Constitution provides that it is the supreme law of the country and any law inconsistent 
with it shall be void to the extent of such inconsistency.75 The approach advocated by Judge 
Gubbay in his 1991 speech is therefore fallacious and must fail in the light of the non 
existence of a hierarchy of provisions in our Constitution.
THE SOCIAL JUSTICE APPROACH
It is intriguing to note that India's Supreme Court under Chief Justice Bhagwati underwent 
a substantive transformation. There was a marked shift from the previous judicial protection 
of private property to enhancing the cause of governmental social engineering programmes. 
According to him, the court " . . .  had become a sentinel of the interests of the propertied 
classes rather than a protector of the rights of the poor and under-priviledged".76
For instance, in SP Gupta v Union of India,77 78he declared:
[Ojur Constitution is not a non-aligned rational charter. It is a document of social 
revolution which casts an obligation on every instrumentality including the judiciary 
. . .  to transform the status quo ante into a new human order in which justice, social, 
economic and political will inform all institutions of national life and there will be 
equality of status and opportunity for all. The judiciary has therefore a socio-economic 
destination and a creative function . . . Where the contest is between those who are 
socially or economically unequal, the judicial process may prove disastrous from the 
point of view of social justice, if the Judge adopts a merely passive or negative role 
and does not adopt a positive and creative approach.7"
74. Didcott, "The Practical Workings of a Bill of Rights" in van der Westhuisen J.V. and Viljoen H.P. (eds) 
Menseregtchandves vir Suid Africa (1988) at p. 60. The same views were expressed by Chaskalson M., 
"The Problem with Property: Thoughts on the Constitutional Protection of Property in the United 
States and Commonwealth" (1993) 9 SAJHR 388 at p. 389.
75. Section 3.
76. Bhagwati, "Public Interest Litigation" (1986) The Commonwealth Lawyer 61 at p. 65.
77. AIR 1982 SC 149.
78. At pp. 196-7.
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However, the court may find it difficult to draw the line between the judicial role and the 
parliamentary or executive one, and this is what eventually happened in India. For example, 
in State o f Himachal Pradesh v Sharma,™ the court conceded that: " . . .  the High Court may 
not take any further action and [must] leave it to the judgement of the priorities and initiative 
both of the executive and legislature to pursue the matter".79 801’
Indeed, Judge Gubbay may find it nebulous to reconcile his "essential features doctrine" 
remarks with the socialistic views he earlier expressed in Chaivanda v Zimnat Insurance Co. 
Ltd,"' in the following terms:
. . .  the expectations among people all over the world, and particularly in developing 
countries, are rising, and the judicial process has a vital role to play in moulding and 
developing the process of social change. The Judiciary can and must operate the law 
so as to fulfil the necessary role of effecting such development. It sometimes happens 
that the goal of social and economic change is reached more quickly through legal 
development by the Judiciary than by the Legislature.82
It would appear that the learned judge is not prepared to take this proposition the full 
distance when confronted with the conflict between the rights to property and the public 
interest in land redistribution. Perhaps, a way out of this predicament is to interpret a 
Constitution which embodies constitutional guarantees for private property rights with 
due regard to the broader social picture and not simply consider the protection of individual 
interests.83 Yet another view is that a judicial distance from politics is ideally accomplished 
by a constitutional review process which essentially limits the task of judges to an evaluation 
of the means rather than the ends of government policy.84 These approaches are preferable 
as they do not result in the judiciary performing executive and/or legislative functions, 
eroding the separation of powers doctrine in the process.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH
Perhaps, South Africa has been more cautious in addressing the issue, realising from its 
history and the divided nature of its society that there was a need to mitigate the impact 
and dimension of any potential confrontation. The Interim Constitution, therefore 
specifically provided for affirmative action. The relevant provision qualifying the general 
prohibition against discrimination, was worded as follows:
This section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate protection 
and advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of all rights 
and freedoms.
79. (1986) 2SCC 68.
80. Atp. 82.
81. 1990 (2) ZLR 143 (SC).
82. At p. 154 B-C. For a criticism of the Chief Justice's proposed approach see, Hlatshwayo B., "Judicial 
Activism and Development — Warning Signals from Zimbabwe" 1991-2 Zimbabwe Law Review 4 at 
pp. 11-12. The author was more cynical in observing that no sooner had the learned judge "waxed 
lyrical" than he was confronted with a legislative attempt to fulfil the expectations of a majority of 
the landless in the form of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution and he had to retreat hastily.
83. van der Walt A.J., "Notes on the Interpretation of the Property Clause in the New Constitution" 1994 
(57) THRHR 181 at p. 189.
84. Murphy J., "Property Rights in the New Constitution: An Analytical Framework" (1993) Journal of 
Ccontemporaiy Roman-Dutch Law 623 at p. 631.
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Every person or community dispossessed of rights in land before the commencement 
of this Constitution under any law . . . shall be entitled to claim restitution of such 
rights.85
Thus, it may be noted that the South African Constitution has to a great extent already pre­
empted legislation such as the Land Acquisition Act of Zimbabwe which is designed to 
redress the inequities of historical land tenure patterns. It may be speculated, therefore, 
that less problems will be encountered in South Africa when land reorganisation gains 
impetus.
While it is helpful to refer to foreign jurisprudence, it should be remembered that the South 
African Constitution provides for "agreed compensation", failing which, "just and 
equitable" compensation as determined by the courts.86 Nevertheless, the constitutional 
criteria of considering all relevant factors, including the use to which the property is being 
put, the history of acquisition,87 its market value, the value of the investments in it by those 
affected and the interests of those affected seems more or less the same under Zimbabwe's 
"fair and reasonable" compensation provision. Developments in Zimbabwe on acquisition 
of land for resettlement should, therefore, be viewed with interest in South Africa.
CONCLUSION
Zimbabwe's land issue is certainly a controversial matter with a potential for much litigation. 
The South African land question is not likely to present itself as monstrously as in Zimbabwe 
since constitutional yardsticks have been included in the Bill of Rights chapter in the form 
of the limitation clause, the affirmative action provisions and basic values which run 
throughout the Constitution.
Historical realities have been allowed to play a role in the consideration of compensation, 
in conjunction with factors like market value and value of the investments to those affected. 
Moreover, the formulation "all relevant factors" adopted in the property clause appears to 
accommodate public interest considerations, even the fact that such payment is ultimately 
a charge on the taxpayer and that in social engineering expropriations the community at 
large is the beneficiary.
It is submitted that this approach should have been adopted at the Lancaster House 
Conference rather than the device of a sunset clause. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the 
provision relating to "other relevant considerations" in the Land Acquisition Act will be 
interpreted to include historical considerations. It would also seem that the requirement 
that the designation of land be reasonably necessary in the national interest will preclude 
politically motivated acquisitions. The courts can (and should) in fact decide on whether 
the acquisition is reasonably necessary to serve any of the specified purposes before going 
into the issue of fairness of the compensation.
85' Section 8(3). The new Constitution carries substantially the same provision (Section 9) by stating that 
to achieve equality "legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken".
86. Section 25.
87. The factors were adverted to by Chidyausiku J. in the Alistair Davies case supra.
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There also appears to be scope for creatively using Indian jurisprudence and administrative 
law principles to decide upon land disputes without necessarily dealing with the more 
vexing question of constitutionality of constitutional amendments. Such an approach is 
desirable considering the political and racial dimensions of the land question. While the 
Indian experience may be a point of reference in the search for answers to balance the 
private property-public interest equation, the Constitutional Review Commission should 
now face the conflict of expectations crisis and fashion a Constitution that is going to achieve 
equitable land redistribution and minimise litigation over land.
In fact, since it is generally accepted that land reform is the foremost method of redressing 
historic inequities imposed by colonialism, the balancing process should be performed by 
those who wield political power and decide on the policies of the nation in consultation 
with those likely to be affected by those policies, the stakeholders. The issue must now not 
be left to judicial law-making, the Constitution must face it head-on. In fact, the exact 
ability of the courts to change values and behaviour (especially bureaucratic behaviour) is 
uncertain.88 It is doubtful that courts are the appropriate vehicle for solving policy questions 
such as how land should be equitably re-organised to redress historical inequities based 
on race.
88. In this regard, Moffat J, "Judicial Review and Environmental Policy: Lessons for Canada from the 
United States" Canadian Public Administration Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring) 140 at p. 152 observed that: "by 
enhancing administrative responsiveness to public pressure on a case-by-case basis, judicial review 
inhibits comprehensive policy planning . . . court-imposed formal requirements can constrain the 
analyst from adopting a flexible approach to promoting efficient decision-making".
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